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Abstract 
Researchers in psychology are frequently confronted with the issue of analyzing multiple 
relationships simultaneously. For example, this could involve multiple outcome variables or 
multiple predictors in a regression framework. Current recommendations typically steer 
researchers toward familywise or false discovery rate Type I error control in order to limit the 
probability of incorrectly rejecting the null hypothesis. Stepwise modified-Bonferroni 
procedures are suggested for following this recommendation. However, longstanding 
arguments against multiplicity control, combined with a modern distaste for null hypothesis 
significance testing, have warranted revisiting this debate. This paper explores both sides of the 
multiplicity control debate with the goal of educating concerned parties regarding best 
practices for conducting multiple related tests. 
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Multiplicity Control, School Uniforms, and other Perplexing Debates 
 While I was in graduate school, I remember attending a talk where the speaker noted in 
the introduction that questions surrounding ‘Bonferroni or the like’ were off limits. As with 
whether or not a school should adopt uniforms, multiplicity issues are especially perplexing and 
often create much confusion for researchers. Take, for example, this recent question on 
ResearchGate: “It seems journals are considering Bonferroni adjustment for p-values of terms 
within a multiple regression model. Has anyone else noticed this? What do you think of the 
trend?” (Maltenfort, 2013). This confusion is especially problematic since using multiple 
outcomes, multiple predictors or multiple treatments in a study both increases the scope of the 
research and maximizes efficiency (Blakesley et al., 2009). As Wilkinson and the Task Force on 
Statistical Inference note, “in many areas of psychology, we cannot do research on important 
problems without encountering multiplicity. We often encounter many variables and many 
relationships” (1999, p. 599). As a statistical consultant, I have dealt with numerous cases 
involving multiplicity issues and the one thing that almost all have in common is confusion over 
which form (if any) of multiplicity control is necessary.  
 Although these difficult decisions regarding multiple testing fall most directly on the 
shoulders of the researchers, they are also experienced by journal editors, reviewers, and 
manuscript readers as they try to interpret the magnitude of the findings of single relationships 
within a study containing evaluations of multiple relationships. This paper explores the 
multiplicity issue in psychological research with the goal of making concerned parties more 
cognizant of the complex issues involved in selecting an appropriate multiple testing strategy.  
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This paper will highlight two extremely common situations which involve multiple 
testing. The first is multiple outcomes. It is rare for researchers to conduct a study with only a 
single primary dependent variable and therefore typically separate tests are conducted on each 
outcome. For example, a researcher might conduct ten one-way ANOVAs separately on ten 
different outcome variables, resulting in ten significance tests. The second situation is multiple 
predictors in regression. Again, with multiple predictors, separate tests on each predictor are 
almost always conducted. For example, one might explore four different predictors of 
depression, and statistical tests on each of the coefficients associated with each predictor 
would be of interest.  
Although multiple outcomes and multiple predictors were selected as examples for 
discussing issues surrounding multiplicity, the same ideas also apply to other multiplicity 
settings (e.g., voxel-wise activation tests in fMRI). In other words, these two situations are 
obviously not the only scenarios in which important multiplicity control decisions need to be 
made, but they provide a platform for introducing the issues involved. In general, any time 
multiple related of tests of significance are conducted, issues surrounding multiplicity control 
will arise. 
 First, multiplicity is defined and the primary issues surrounding multiplicity control are 
outlined. To do this we revisit one of the most common settings for multiplicity, namely 
comparing multiple groups on an outcome variable. Second, a discussion of the multiplicity 
issues involved in each situation is provided. These first two sections are meant to provide the 
reader with a snapshot of current practice and options for controlling for multiplicity in 
psychological research. The paper ends by tying together current thinking on multiplicity 
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control with current thinking on null hypothesis significance testing. The paper aims to raise 
awareness regarding the issues and potential solutions surrounding multiplicity control and 
thus provide involved parties with more information on which to make important multiplicity 
decisions. The overarching goal is to make concrete recommendations regarding the adoption 
of multiplicity control in psychological research. 
Multiplicity/Multiplicity Control 
 Multiplicity (in the statistical sense) refers to testing multiple hypotheses with the goal 
of isolating those which are statistically significant. Let’s say we are comparing the speed at 
which participants walk, where participants are separated into four groups. Each group is 
primed with a different list of words; the word lists related to a race (e.g., winner, fast), fast 
vehicles (e.g., speedboat, motorcycle), seniors (e.g.,  grey, cane) or control (e.g., book, chair). 
The research hypothesis is that priming will affect subsequent walking speeds (see Bargh, Chen 
& Burrows, 1996). Our interest might be in all of the pairwise comparisons (race vs fast vehicles, 
race vs seniors, etc.) in order to isolate exactly which differences in priming lists result in 
differences in walking speed. Thus, we are testing six pairwise null hypotheses, each comparing 
the population means for two different types of word lists (e.g., H0: μrace = μfast; H0: μrace = 
μseniors). Each test will be conducted with a specific probability of making a Type I error (α), 
which is often called a false positive and represents the acceptable probability of concluding 
that a difference in the population occurs when in fact the population means do not differ.  
 Now the tricky part: if we conduct multiple tests, each with a Type I error probability αT 
(α level for each test), then the overall probability of a Type I error (α’) across all six tests will be 
higher than the probability of a Type I error for each test. If all of the tests are independent, α’ 
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approaches 1 – (1 – αT)T, where T represents the number of tests conducted. It is important to 
consider how strongly related the tests are that you are conducting, because the strength of 
the relationships among the tests affects the degree of inflation of α’. Pairwise comparisons are 
related because some of the test share the same variable (e.g., the tests associated with the 
hypotheses H0: μrace = μfast and H0: μrace = μseniors are related because they share the variable 
‘rate’; they might also be related because they use a common denominator, but this depends 
on the nature of the test statistic adopted). As the correlation among the tests increases, α’ will 
be reduced, with α’ = αT = α if the tests were (but realistically speaking never will be) all 
perfectly correlated (i.e., the decisions are always identical for all tests). In other words, as the 
correlation among the tests increases, the overall inflation in the Type I error rate decreases. 
Obviously α’ also depends on how many of the null hypotheses are true; for example if none 
are true then α’ = 0. [We will dwell on this issue later in the paper.] 
 For our pairwise comparison problem above, one solution is to treat each test as 
separate and to ignore the fact that multiple tests of significance are being conducted. In this 
situation, we are controlling the probability of a Type I error separately for each test, so we can 
label our multiplicity control strategy ‘per test’ Type I error control (αPT). This is the simplest 
form of multiplicity control. As Hancock and Klockars (1996) playfully proposed, if αPT control 
was unilaterally adopted, all multiple testing would easily be conducted and multiple testing 
researchers would be unemployed. 
 A second solution is to control the probability of at least one Type I error at α across all 
six comparisons (i.e., split up α across all of the tests). Since we are controlling the rate of Type I 
error over the family of six pairwise hypotheses, this method of Type I error control is often 
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referred to as familywise error control (αFW). The term family refers to the set of tests over 
which we are concerned about Type I error inflation (e.g., pairwise comparisons, separate tests 
on each outcome variable, all slope coefficients in a multiple regression). The most popular 
method of αFW control is the Bonferroni method (Dunn, 1961). This procedure controls for 
multiplicity by dividing the overall probability of a Type I error αFW by the number of tests 
conducted. The resulting per-test alpha level is αT = α / T. For a summary of the discussed 
multiplicity control options and notation, see Table 1. The Bonferroni procedure is an example 
of a single-step/simultaneous multiple testing procedure since all comparisons are done 
simultaneously using the same αT.  
 Numerous alternatives to the Bonferroni procedure for controlling α’ at α have been 
proposed, with the Holm (1979) procedure a flexible and popular alternative. The Holm 
procedure makes inferences regarding statistical significance in a stepwise manner. The term 
stepwise, as opposed to single-step/simultaneous, implies that the significance tests take place 
in a prespecified order and αT can depend on the specific stage of testing. More specifically, for 
the Holm procedure the p-values are initially ordered from smallest to largest, and in the first 
step the smallest p-value is compared against α / T. If this test is not significant, then none of 
the null hypotheses can be rejected. If this test is significant, then the second smallest p-value is 
compared to α / (T – 1), again retaining all remaining null hypotheses if the test is not significant 
and moving on to the next stage of testing if the test is significant. Summarizing, at each stage 
the p-values are compared to α / (T-i), where i represents the number of previously rejected 
hypotheses; if the p-values associated with any hypotheses are not rejected then all the 
remaining null hypotheses (i.e., those associated with larger p-values) are also not rejected.  
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 Lastly, a researcher could also control the expected proportion of the number of Type I 
errors out of all rejected null hypotheses, called the false discovery rate (αFDR; Benjamini & 
Hochberg, 1995; Keselman, Cribbie & Holland, 1999). The false discovery rate provides more 
liberal control of the Type I error rate than αFW, but does not completely ignore the multiplicity 
issue like αPT (Cribbie, 2003). Note that αFDR-based procedures are more powerful than αFW 
procedures, in general, because αFDR controls the rate of Type I errors over all rejected 
hypotheses, instead of all tested hypotheses. Although this is not an exhaustive list of error 
rates that can be controlled (also see Keselman, Cribbie & Holland, 2002 and Keselman, Miller, 
& Holland, 2011 for examples of alternative error rates), these three methods of controlling for 
Type I errors (αPT, αFW, αFDR) represent the most commonly adopted approaches.  
 Some very convincing arguments for αPT control have been provided by Carmer and 
Walker (1985), Rothman (1990), Saville (1990; 2003), and others. The primary message of these 
articles is that conducting T tests of significance within one study has the same goals as 
conducting T studies each with a single test of significance. In other words, in the pairwise 
multiple comparison problem above, conducting all T = 6 pairwise comparisons in one study is 
strategically no different than conducting six studies each with T = 1 pairwise comparisons so 
why should there be a penalty for conducting all the tests together? Saville takes this argument 
further and asserts that consistency across studies is important; whether a researcher conducts 
one test in a study (and therefore does not have to control for multiplicity) or several tests in a 
study, the number of tests conducted should not affect the conclusion for each individual test. 
Essentially, the argument is that we should not penalize a researcher for conducting more 
extensive research. αFW and αFDR procedures are considered inconsistent tests since the α 
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probability for each test depends on how many other related tests are being conducted. 
Another argument that has been put forth in support of αPT is that αFW and αFDR increase the 
probability of a Type II error (e.g., Nakagawa, 2004; Rothman). However, an increased 
probability of Type II errors should never be used as an argument for adopting αPT control. 
Decisions regarding multiplicity control should always be made a priori and therefore the study 
should be powered for the adjusted α level. This point was made clear by Kruschke (2010), who 
explains how the intentions of the researcher can impact p-values, multiple comparisons, etc. 
As outlined above, different multiple testing procedures lead to different ‘levels’ of control; if 
decisions are made a priori, any decisions made after the data is available would need to be 
treated with skepticism.   
 However, the arguments in support of αPT have had trouble standing up to the position 
that conducting multiple tests in a study raises the overall probability of a Type I error, α’ (Bland 
& Altman, 1995; Hancock & Klockars, 1996; Ryan, 1959, 1962; Tyler, Normand, & Horton, 2011). 
For example, Holland, Basu and Sun (2010) highlighted that false alarms related to the health 
concerns of Bisphenol A (BPA, in baby bottles), polyvinylchloride (PVC, in toys), and silicone (in 
breast implants) were caused by researchers ignoring multiplicity. 
 According to Westfall and Young (1993), if any of the following statements are true then 
a researcher should be concerned about inflated Type I error rates: 1) It is plausible that some 
effects might be null; 2) You are prepared to perform many tests of significance in order to find 
a significant result; 3) Your analysis is exploratory, yet you still want to be confident that a 
significant result is ‘real’; 4) Replication of the experiment is unlikely; 5) There is a “cost” 
associated with a Type I error; or 6) You want to ensure that the overall rate of Type I error is 
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held at α. These guidelines cover almost any multiple testing situation imaginable and provide a 
stark contrast to the arguments of supporters of αPT.  
 Arguments in favor of αFDR center around the need for a compromise between strict αFW 
and liberal αPT control, and are especially appealing when the number of hypotheses to be 
tested becomes very large (e.g., fMRI evaluations where thousands of tests are simultaneously 
conducted on different voxels within the brain). Cribbie (2003) demonstrated that, in many 
popular multiple testing situations, αFDR provides an excellent balance between Type I error 
control and power (i.e., minimizing the combined probability of Type I and Type II errors). 
Multiplicity Control with Multiple Outcomes 
 Few studies in psychology have only a single outcome variable (Lix & Sajobi, 2010; Tyler 
et al., 2011), and of the majority of studies that have multiple outcome variables, most do 
nothing to address the multiplicity issue (Vickerstaff, Ambler, King, Nazareth, & Omar, 2015). 
Wason, Stecher and Mander (2014), Vickerstaff et al., and others have posited that αFW control 
is necessary when multiple outcomes are analyzed, and Vickerstaff et al. found that if αFW 
control had been adopted in studies that used no control that the conclusions of many of them 
would be overturned.  
 Numerous studies have been conducted that discuss solutions for dealing with multiple 
outcome variables, exploring a wide variety of options. For example, one could select a single 
primary outcome, create a composite variable (e.g., sum together the scores), explore an 
overall treatment effect (e.g., combining the treatment effect across multiple standardized 
variables), or conduct a multivariate test (Bender & Lange, 2001; Logan & Tamhane, 2004; 
Wilkinson et al., 1999). Each of these solutions has in common the goal of reducing the testing 
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problem from multiple tests to a single test, with the multivariate solution the most popular in 
the literature. If researchers are interested in the multivariate effect and are not interested in 
the univariate effects of each outcome variable, then multivariate tests are recommended and 
valuable. However, it is rare that a linear combination of outcome variables is of interest 
(Huberty & Morris, 1989), and therefore multivariate tests are rarely conducted in practice 
(Counsell & Harlow, 2016; Vickerstaff et al., 2015). Vickerstaff et al. reported that only two out 
of sixty trials with multiple primary outcomes used a MANOVA. When they do use a 
multivariate analysis, they almost always follow-up the test with separate univariate analyses of 
each outcome (Huberty & Morris; Vickerstaff et al.).  
 Huberty and Morris reviewed current practice and also explained why the use of a 
preliminary MANOVA before conducting univariate ANOVAs is not only unnecessary from the 
standpoint of multiplicity control, but also irrelevant for addressing the dominant research 
question that relates to the specific treatment effect for each outcome. They reviewed several 
psychology journals and found that, of researchers who used a MANOVA, only 3 out of 81 
conducted a MANOVA without follow-up univariate ANOVAs. Thus, multivariate tests rarely 
match the theoretical goals of researchers and do little to minimize the effects of multiplicity 
since univariate tests are a regular follow-up procedure. As Huberty & Morris summarized, “in 
none of the 222 multiple outcome variable studies was there much interest expressed in any 
structure associated with the MANOVA results” (p. 302). Lastly, Huberty and Morris, Bird & 
Hadzi-Pavlovic (2014), and others have shown that using a MANOVA as preliminary test 
provides only illusory protection of the familywise error rate is 
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 Another solution is to use αFW control (e.g., Bonferroni-type procedures). Although Tyler 
et al. (2011) found that most researchers did not adjust for multiplicity with multiple outcomes, 
if they did they used Bonferroni-type procedures. This same finding was reported by Baron, 
Perrodeau, Boutron, and Ravaud (2013), who found that the original Bonferroni procedure was 
the most popular adjustment for multiplicity in multi-arm clinical trials.  
 The original Bonferroni procedure becomes extremely conservative as the number of 
outcome variables increases, however stepwise modified Bonferroni procedures (e.g., Holm), as 
discussed previously, provide substantially greater power, good αFW control, and are flexible 
enough to use in almost any situation (Blakesley et al., 2009). Researchers have explored 
improvements to the Holm and other stepwise procedures, however rarely are the 
improvements substantial. For example, Lix and Sajobi (2010) and Troendle (1995) explored 
resampling-based stepwise procedures that control for the correlations among the outcome 
variables, however the gains in power were minimal over the original stepwise procedures. 
 Another option is to weight some outcome variables more highly than others. Alosh, 
Bretz, and Huque (2011) and Wang et al. (2009) discuss methods based on hierarchically 
organized hypotheses. In the fixed sequence strategy, all hypotheses are tested at level α but 
lower order hypotheses are only tested if higher order hypotheses are statistically significant. 
With fallback procedures, the total α is divided among the hypotheses and rejecting the null 
hypothesis associated with higher order hypotheses is not required for testing lower order 
hypotheses. However, if a hypothesis is rejected, all of its weight (α) is carried to the next 
hypothesis in the sequence. See Alosh et al. and Wang et al. for more details on hierarchical 
options. Although these procedures provide a better way to spend the allotted α probability 
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with hierarchically ordered hypotheses, in how many instances are researchers able to weight 
the importance of their outcome variables? Even more importantly, should the α-level for a 
given hypothesis depend on how important that outcome variable is relative to other outcome 
variables?  
 To conclude, although numerous options are available if αFW (or αFDR) control are 
desired, stepwise Bonferroni-type procedures (e.g., Holm) are recommended for their Type I 
error control, power, simplicity and availability in popular software packages (Blakesley et al., 
2009). As Dmitrienko and D’Agostino (2013) concluded, unless researchers have an interest in 
specifying quite different weights to hypotheses, traditional stepwise Bonferroni-type 
procedures generally perform as well or better than more complicated alternative procedures. 
Multiple Regression 
 Multiple regression is one of the most common forms of analysis conducted in 
psychology. Two or more variables are used to predict scores on a single outcome variable, and 
the multiplicity issue arises because researchers are typically interested in the unique 
contribution of each included predictor. In other words, the statistical significance of each 
predictor is often of interest and therefore multiple null hypothesis tests are conducted. It is 
important to point out that if the model is simply used for prediction that no multiplicity issues 
arise. More specifically, if the full model is used to predict the outcome, without null hypothesis 
tests for determining which predictors are statistically significant or should be retained in the 
model, then there are no Type I errors.  
 Although researchers are generally aware of the inflation in the overall α' with stepwise 
regression, prescreening of predictors, etc. (Freedman, 1983), it is still rare for researchers to 
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adopt any form of multiplicity control when assessing the statistical significance of multiple 
predictors in regression. Larzelere and Mulaik (1977) pointed out about 40 years ago that when 
assessing the statistical significance of multiple correlations that some sort of multiplicity 
control is necessary to control for an inflated risk of Type I errors. Cribbie (2000) pointed out 
the same result when multiple hypotheses are evaluated in structural equation models. The 
same basic issues apply to multiple regression; if you evaluate the statistical significance of 
multiple predictors without any form of multiplicity control then α' will be greater than α (with 
smaller correlations among the predictors resulting in a greater difference between α and α').  
 As expected, the same solutions proposed for multiple outcomes are applicable for 
multiple predictors in regression. Stepwise Bonferroni procedures (e.g., Holm) are 
straightforward, effective at controlling αFW = α, available in most statistical software packages 
and little is gained by adopting more complex versions of these tests (e.g., Troendle, 1995). 
However, if αFDR control is preferred or different weights are applied to each predictor, then the 
procedures described in the sections above may provide better results. Smith and Cribbie 
(2013) also proposed a strategy for controlling for the dependencies among the null hypothesis 
tests. This approach was proposed within the field of structural equation modeling, however 
the same procedure is applicable in multiple regression. Essentially, since more highly 
correlated test statistics lead to less of an inflation of α', Smith and Cribbie proposed that the 
Bonferroni-type adjustments be weighted by the correlations among the parameters. In the 
case of multiple regression, this would involve controlling for the correlations among the 
coefficients for the predictors. Highly correlated parameter estimates would not require the 
same degree of control as weakly correlated parameter estimates due to the larger amount of 
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information overlap (recall that αFW, or α’ in general, are largest with independent test statistics 
and no Type I error inflation is observed when the tests are perfectly correlated). 
Stop the Bus: The Multiplicity Control and School Uniform Debates are Not Over Yet 
 Until now, the debate seems pretty one sided. Most of the psychology literature and the 
discussion above have revolved around how to control αFW. In short, recommendations to date 
center on the premise that if you want to test multiple hypotheses then you better do 
something to ensure that there is not a high risk that some tests will be significant by chance 
alone. However, the marriage of some old ideas about multiplicity control (e.g., Rothman, 1990; 
Saville, 1990), with a new perspective on the role of null hypothesis testing (e.g., Cumming, 
2014), has significantly altered the debate regarding multiplicity control in psychology.  
 Let’s start with revisiting the ideas of Saville (1990, 2003) and Rothman (1990). Saville 
(1990) notes that the number of Type I errors one makes depends on how many of the tested 
null hypotheses are true. Since very few (if any) effects are ever null (i.e., very few null 
hypotheses are ever true), there is little concern about the effects of multiplicity (Gelman, Hill, 
& Yajima, 2012). Rothman (1990) agrees, commenting that the value of adjustments for 
multiple testing are seen mostly in simulation studies where random numbers are generated 
and therefore all null hypotheses are true. Put another way, we assume that the universe is 
governed by natural laws and relationships, and therefore using the null hypothesis as a 
starting point is “in effect, to suspend belief in the real world and thereby to question the 
premises of empiricism” (Rothman, p. 44). To summarize, if the null is never true then there is 
no such thing as a Type I error and hence controlling for an inflation of the Type I error rate is 
unnecessary. 
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 A second point raised by Saville (1990) is that the relationship being investigated is the 
natural unit of analysis, not the family of hypotheses, or the experiment, or the set of 
experiments, or all hypotheses tested under a research grant, or all hypotheses tested in a 
researcher’s career, or all hypotheses tested in a discipline, etc. This is highly related to the idea 
of consistency discussed earlier; the criteria for evaluating one relationship should not depend 
on how many other relationships are investigated.  
 The next point raised by Saville (1990) liaises nicely with modern thinking (e.g., 
Cumming, 2014; Gelman et al., 2012). In most research situations, the focus should be on 
estimation (i.e., precise estimates of parameters), not statistical significance. When the focus is 
on estimation, rather than statistical significance, multiplicity has no effect on the results or 
conclusions. In short, null hypothesis tests provide only a small piece of information regarding 
an association; the bulk of the information comes from model parameters, effect sizes, 
replication, confidence intervals, meta-analyses, and the like (Cumming; Gelman et al.). The 
transformation in psychology from a reliance on null hypothesis tests to a distaste for null 
hypothesis tests, at least in the past few years, has been quick and impactful (Cumming & Calin-
Jageman, 2017; Trafimow & Marks, 2015). The quick turnaround in thinking even prompted the 
American Statistical Association to release a statement on null hypothesis significance testing 
(Wasserstein & Lazar, 2016), where the authors explain what p-values can and cannot tell you 
about your results. 
 Imagine that we are exploring the difference between males and females on depression, 
mathematical ability, and perfectionism. In most situations, our primary focus should be on all 
facets of the difference between males and females on each outcome variable, what Tukey 
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(1977) called exploratory data analysis, not only on the statistical significance of each of these 
comparisons or controlling for how many tests we are conducting. This sort of analysis includes 
mean differences, median differences, differences in variability, distributional shape 
differences, differences in outliers, posterior distributions, etc. This would also include ensuring 
precise estimation of the differences via large sample sizes, valid and reliable instruments, 
proper models, and encouraging replications of the findings. For example, Gelman et al. (2012) 
make it clear that by adopting more sophisticated models (e.g., multilevel models with Bayesian 
estimates) we can obtain more robust estimates of the parameters. At the same time, as Cohen 
(in press) highlights, it is important to acknowledge that different areas of research have 
different goals, and the focus of research in one area, say effect sizes, might be quite different 
from the focus in another area, e.g., direction of effects. In general though, it is important to 
think of each relationship as the natural unit of analysis and to focus all available energy on 
finding out the most about that relationship as possible.  
 Can null hypothesis testing be a part of this process? Currently, that is a much debated 
point, with some completely opposed to p-values and null hypothesis testing (e.g., Trafimow & 
Marks, 2015; Cumming, 2014), while others are more tolerant and recognize the value of the 
information provided by the p-value and its interpretation (Wasserstein & Lazar, 2016). There is 
little debate that the focus of most current research in psychology is still typically hypothesis 
testing, however methodological discussions at conferences, in blogs and papers, etc. seem to 
indicate that more radical changes to practice are near. Obviously this observation is subjective, 
however in addition to the published articles supporting this contention referred to above, 
there are also some quantitative indicators that discussions surrounding null hypothesis testing 
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are spiking. For example, a ‘Google Scholar’ search for the words “null”, “hypothesis” and 
“testing” in the title of articles returned 16 hits for articles published in 2005/2006, 27 hits for 
articles published in 2010/2011, and 49 hits for articles published in 2015/2016.  
 If null hypothesis testing becomes only a minor part of the research process, then 
should multiplicity control be necessary? There is no debating that α' will rise as the number of 
tests increases, but is that an issue when our focus is on precisely estimating the nature of the 
relationship? We also cannot forget the convincing arguments of Saville (1990) and Rothman 
(1990) for not invoking multiplicity control at all. 
Conclusion 
 Some debates continue for years with no sign of resolve, including school uniforms, free 
will, nature/nurture, and whether the chicken or the egg came first. The debate over school 
uniforms has continued for decades. For example, proponents see a valuable way to minimize 
arguments/bullying over fashion/style, while opponents see the loss of a child’s sense of 
individuality. Interestingly, proponents of both sides argue that costs are lower with their 
preference. Is the multiplicity debate as unwinnable as the school uniform debate? For many 
years the prevailing sentiment has been that it is important to control for multiplicity when 
conducting multiple null hypothesis tests, and this sentiment has not only applied to multiple 
comparisons in an ANOVA setting but also to regression, multiple outcome variables, structural 
equation modeling, voxel evaluations in functional magnetic resonance imaging, etc.  
 However, the recent abrupt shift in focus from null hypothesis testing to precise 
estimation of relationships (at least, for now, in the methodological literature) has definitely 
made the debate more perplexing (and interesting). The role of multiplicity control in 
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psychology will depend to a large extent on the role that null hypothesis testing and 
dichotomous thinking play in psychology. Currently, null hypothesis testing still dominates 
published research and instruction in psychology and if that continues researchers need to be 
aware of and use the techniques described earlier in the paper because they will likely be 
required by book/journal editors, reviewers, etc. Editors and reviewers list conducting multiple 
tests without adjustment as one of the most popular statistical errors in submitted manuscripts 
(Harris, Reeder, & Hyun, 2011). On the other hand, if, as expected, null hypothesis testing 
eventually takes on a very minor role in the evaluation of relationships, then discussions 
surrounding multiplicity control may all but disappear. Precisely estimating relationships avoids 
dichotomous thinking and errors of statistical inference (Type I/II), and thus multiplicity control 
is unnecessary.  
 Here is a brief summary regarding recommendations for evaluating multiple 
relationships, be that multiple comparisons of means, multiple outcomes, multiple predictors in 
regression, etc.: 
 
1) If the statistical analyses rely heavily on null hypothesis significance testing (and it should be 
clear from the discussion above that this strategy is generally not recommended), then the 
nature/goals of the research might drive the decision regarding multiplicity control. However, 
policies of the publication outlet for the research might also come into play; although 
researchers might agree with proponents of αPT control, currently most editors and reviewers 
require αFW (or in some cases αFDR) control in order to minimize the probability of Type I errors. 
If αFW (or αFDR) multiplicity control is necessary, stepwise Bonferroni-type procedures (e.g., 
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Holm) are recommended for their simplicity, balance of Type I error control and power, and 
availability in popular software packages such as R, SAS and STATA. 
 
2) If the statistical analyses prioritize estimation over null hypothesis significance testing, the 
recommended approach in most research settings, then multiplicity control is unnecessary 
since hypothesis testing (and hence Type I errors) are a minor part of the analysis strategy. 
 
 Like a parent waiting on a decision regarding school uniforms, the field of psychology is 
currently waiting to see what position editors, textbook authors, governing bodies, etc. take 
regarding null hypothesis significance testing and, consequently, multiplicity control. However, 
Gigerenzer (2004), regarding ritualistic null hypothesis testing, recommends a more active 
approach that definitely applies here: “We need some pounds of courage to cease playing along 
in this embarrassing game. This may cause friction with editors and colleagues, but it will in the 
end help them to enter the dawn of statistical thinking” (p. 604). Current sentiments point 
towards p-values and null hypothesis testing taking on a very minor role in quantitative 
methods for psychology, but for now the debate rages on and the decisions, approaches and 
rationales of individual researchers may determine the future path of multiple testing analyses 
in psychology.  
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Table 1. 
Summary of the notation regarding per-test and familywise multiplicity control. 
 
Type of Multiplicity 
Control 
Proposed Overall  
Type I Error Rate (α’)  
Type I Error Rate for  
Each Test (αT) 
Per-Test (αPT) α’ ≤ 1 – (1 – αT)T αT = α 
Familywise (αFW) α’ = α αT ≤ α (depends on procedure) 
e.g., Bonferroni αT = α / T   
Note: α = maximum permissible Type I error rate; αPT = per-test α level; αFW = familywise Type I 
error rate; T = number of statistical tests. 
 
